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     This paper estimates a long-run demand function for M1,
using U.S. data for 1959-1993.  The paper interprets deviations
from this long-run relation with Goldfeld’s partial adjustment
model.  A key innovation is the choice of the interest rate in
the money demand function.  Most previous work uses a short-term
market rate, but this paper uses the average return on “near
monies” -- close substitutes for M1 such as savings accounts and
money market mutual funds.  This approach yields a predicted path
of M1 velocity that closely matches the data.  The volatility of
velocity after 1980 is explained by volatility in the returns on
near monies.1
I. INTRODUCTION
     Is there a stable demand function for narrow money? 
Starting with Poole (1988) and Lucas (1988), there is a growing
consensus that long-run money demand is stable.  This view is
supported by the finding of a cointegrating relation among real
M1, interest rates, and output (e.g. Hoffman and Rasche, 1991;
Stock and Watson, 1993).  At the same time, most researchers view
the short-run behavior of money demand -- the fluctuations of
real balances around their long-run level -- as unstable and
mysterious.  Partial-adjustment models of money demand broke down
in the 1970s, and attempts to repair them have failed (Goldfeld
and Sichel, 1990).  M1 velocity has fluctuated a lot since the
early 1980s, and observers attribute this fact to unexplained
shifts in money demand (e.g. Mankiw, 1997).  
     This paper questions the conventional wisdom.  It argues
that there is in fact a stable money demand function that
explains short-run velocity movements.  I obtain this result
partly by combining ideas from previous work: I integrate current
models of long-run money demand with a partial adjustment model
from the 1970s.  There is, however, one crucial innovation in the
approach: the choice of the interest rate in the money demand
function.  Most previous work uses a short-term market rate such
as the Treasury Bill rate or the commercial paper rate.  I use
instead the average return on "near monies" -- close substitutes
for M1 such as savings accounts and money market mutual funds. 2
Short-run fluctuations in money holdings are closely tied to
movements in near-money returns.
     Section II of this paper introduces the return on near
monies.  I define a "near money" as any bank account with zero
maturity that is not part of M1.  Equivalently, near monies
include all the non-M1 components of M2 except for time deposits. 
The liquidity of these assets makes them the closest substitutes
for M1.
     To build intuition, Section III looks informally at the data
on money and interest rates.  Perhaps the biggest puzzle about
money demand is the apparent shift in its behavior in the early
1980s.  M1 velocity followed a smooth upward trend through the
60s and 70s, but this trend broke abruptly with the "velocity
shock" of 1981-82; since then, velocity has continued to
fluctuate.  This history can be explained by the behavior of
near-money returns, which also grew smoothly until the 80s and
then became volatile.  This behavior reflects deregulation and
financial innovation, which made near-money returns more
responsive to market interest rates.  
     Section IV estimates long-run money demand functions for the
period 1960 through 1993.  (I end the sample in 1993 to avoid the
complications caused by "sweep" accounts.)  Long-run money demand
is stable regardless of whether the interest rate is measured by
the return on near monies or a money-market rate (the T-bill
rate).  However, the deviations of money holdings from their
long-run level are smaller with the return on near monies.  With3
this interest rate, there is less variation that must be
explained by a model of short-run dynamics.
     Section V interprets deviations from long-run money demand
with Goldfeld’s (1973) partial-adjustment model.  When the
interest rate is the return on near monies, the model yields
reasonable parameter estimates, and it is not rejected in favor
of a less structured error-correction model.  Most important, the
deviations of money holdings from the predictions of the model
are small.  There is little evidence of shifts in the money
demand function, even in the short run.  
     Section VI concludes the paper.
II. THE RETURN ON NEAR MONIES
     Most work on M1 demand measures the opportunity cost of
money with a short-term market interest rate -- usually the
commmercial paper rate or the Treasury Bill rate.  As discussed
by Hoffman et al. (1995), the choice of an interest rate is not
critical for studies of long-run money demand.  Most interest
rates follow similar trends, and thus have the same long-run
relation to real balances.  In contrast, different interest rates
have different short-run dynamics, so studies of short-run money
demand must choose an interest rate carefully.
     Which interest rates affect M1 demand?  In theory, the
effect of an asset’s return on the demand for another asset
depends on the substitutability of the assets.  The demand for M1
should depend most strongly on the returns to its close1 Carlson and Byrne’s definition of MZM includes an additional
asset that is not part of M2: institutional money market funds.  To
be conservative,  I exclude these funds from my definition of near-
monies.  
4
substitutes.  In looking for such “near monies,” a natural
starting point is assets that are included in M2 but not M1:
savings accounts, money market mutual funds, and so on.  These
assets are close substitutes for M1 because they are highly
liquid.
    One can refine the definition of near monies by looking
within the non-M1 part of M2.  All assets in this category are 
bank accounts with zero maturity, with the exception of time
deposits.  Time deposits are less liquid than zero-maturity
accounts, and hence less perfect substitutes for M1.  This fact
has led some researchers to deemphasize the M2 aggregate in favor
of M2 less time deposits – “zero maturity money,” or MZM (Motley,
1988; Carlson and Byrne, 1992).  In the same spirit, I exclude
time deposits from my definition of near monies.  Near monies are
defined as the non-M1 components of MZM, or equivalently the non-
M1 components of M2 except time deposits.  There are three near
monies: savings accounts, retail money market mutual funds, and
money market deposit accounts.1      
     The three near monies have somewhat different interest
rates.  For parsimony, I do not examine the individual interest
rates, but rather take an average.  In each period, the average
is weighted by the shares of each asset in total near money. 
These shares change greatly over time.  In the 1960s, near monies5
consisted entirely of savings accounts, but by the 80s more than
half were money market mutual funds and money market deposit
accounts.  Despite these changes, the series that I construct is
a consistent measure of the average return on zero-maturity, non-
transaction bank accounts.
     The cost of holding M1 rather than a near money is the
difference between these assets’ returns.  The returns on M1 are
zero before 1973 but slightly positive thereafter, because some
demand deposits pay interest.  In the analysis below, I assume
that money demand depends on the average return on near monies
minus the average return on M1.  The results are similar when I
do not subtract the return on M1.        
     The average returns on near monies and M1 are computed from 
data on the components of M2 and their returns.  These data are
maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond; see Hetzel
(1989) for documentation.
III. VELOCITY AND INTEREST RATES, 1960-1993
     To build intuition, this section examines informally the
behavior of M1 velocity and alternative interest rates.  I
consider the period from 1960 through 1993.  1960 is the first
full year with data on near-money interest rates.  The endpoint
of 1993 avoids the complications arising from "sweep" programs,
which were introduced in 1994.  Under sweep programs, banks move
customers’ funds between different accounts to reduce required
reserves.  This behavior complicates the measurement of narrow6
money, as the funds are available for transactions but are not
always included in M1.  As discussed in the conclusion, future
work could address this problem and extend this paper’s analysis
to the present.
     Figure 1 presents annual data on M1 velocity, the Treasury
Bill rate (R
TB), and the return on near monies less the return on 
M1 (R
NM).  The velocity data show why economists believe that
money demand is unstable.  Velocity followed a smooth upward
trend until 1981, but then it began to fluctuate erratically. 
These fluctuations led the Federal Reserve to deemphasize M1
targets in 1982 and to stop publishing them at all in 1986. 
Historical accounts attribute the velocity movements to shifts in
money demand that are “mostly unexplained” (Mankiw, 1997). 
According to Friedman (1988), the relationship between M1 and
income "utterly fell apart" in the 1980s.    
     This experience becomes less puzzling when we examine the
behavior of interest rates.  Consider first the Treasury bill
rate in the middle panel of Figure 1.  The T-bill data suggest
explanations for two aspects of velocity behavior.  The first is
the shift of the long-run velocity trend from positive to
slightly negative after 1981.  This shift can be explained by a
coincident shift in the trend of the T-bill rate, which raised
the quantity of money demanded.  This story is confirmed by
econometric work on long-run money demand, which finds a stable
relation between the trends in M1, output, and the T-bill rate
(e.g. Ball, 2001).        7
     In addition, the T-bill data get us partway to an
explanation for short-run velocity fluctuations.  Velocity fell
in 1982-83 (the "velocity shock" of the Volcker era), rose in
1984, fell sharply in 1985-87 (the "M1 explosion"), and so on. 
These velocity shifts are matched almost exactly by changes in
the T-bill rate: only in 1990 do the two variables move in
opposite directions.  Thus, for the period after 1980, one can
interpret most changes in velocity as movements along a money
demand curve caused by interest-rate changes.  There is no need
to invoke unexplained shifts in the curve.
     However, Figure 1 also shows the problem with this story: it
does not fit the period before 1981.  The T-bill rate fluctuated
a lot in the late 1960s and 70s as well as the 80s.  If the T-
bill rate affects velocity, velocity should have started
fluctuating much earlier.  Instead, movements in the T-bill rate
did not disturb the smooth velocity trend until the early 80s,
when something seems to have changed.  The experience before 1981
explains why the 80s were surprising: economists were not used to
seeing velocity respond to interest-rate movements.
     In contrast, the return on near monies can explain velocity
behavior both before and after 1981.  After 1981, R
NM fluctuates
along with the T-bill rate.  Before 1981, it follows the upward
trend of the T-bill rate, but its path is smoother.  This pattern
-- a steady rise through 1981 and then fluctuations -- matches
the behavior of velocity.  Thus the increase in the volatility of
velocity can be explained by increased volatility in R
NM.   8
     The behavior of R
NM changed in the 1980s because of
deregulation and financial innovation.  Before the 80s, near-
monies were mainly savings accounts with regulated interest
rates.  These rates followed the trend in market rates, but did
not respond to short-run fluctuations.  Deregulation reduced the
rigidity in savings rates.  In addition, the 1980s produced near
monies with rates that closely track market rates, such as money
market mutual funds.  As a result, R
NM started to fluctuate along
with R
TB.  
     In some ways, this story is familiar.  Many authors suggest
that the instability of velocity reflects deregulation and
financial innovation (e.g. Goldfeld and Sichel, 1990).  However,
these developments are usually viewed as causing a breakdown in
the money demand function.  In contrast, I interpret them as
causing changes in the behavior of interest rates, and hence
movements along a stable money demand curve.
IV. DEVIATIONS FROM LONG-RUN MONEY DEMAND
     Here I compare long-run money-demand equations with
alternative interest rates.  There is a long-run cointegrating
relation between real balances, income, and interest rates
regardless of whether the interest rate is the T-bill rate or
R
NM.  However, the deviations of actual money holdings from the
long-run level are smaller for R
NM.
     A. Long-Run Equations
     Following Stock and Watson (1993) and Ball (2001), I9
estimate money demand functions of the form 
   (1)     m - p  =  " + 2yy + 2RR + , ,
where m is the log of M1, p is the log of the GDP deflator, y is
the log of real GDP, R is the level of an interest rate, and ,
is an error term.  2y is the long-run income elasticity of money
demand and 2R is the interest-rate semi-elasticity.
     Most authors measure R with the Treasury bill rate or the
commercial paper rate.  For these interest rates, previous work
finds that the variables m-p, y, and R are cointegrated of order
one.  Thus equation (1) can be interpreted as a cointegrating
relation, and the error , is stationary.  Using the Treasury
bill rate, I confirm the finding of cointegration for the period
1959:2 through 1993:4.  The Johansen test with two or four lags
rejects non-cointegration at the one percent level.  
    Because (1) is a cointegrating relation, one can estimate its
parameters with Stock and Watson's (1993) Dynamic OLS estimator
(DOLS).  Table I presents the results: the income elasticity is
0.53 and the interest rate semi-elasticity is -0.040.  These
estimates are close to those of Ball (2001) and Dutkowsky and
Cynamon (2001b).
     I now replace the T-bill rate in equation (1) with the
return on near-monies.  With this interest rate, there is still a
cointegrating relation among m-p, y, and R: the Johansen test
rejects non-cointegration at the one percent level with two lags
and the five percent level with four lags.  These results support 
Hoffman et al.’s suggestion that different interest rates serve10
equally well in long-run money demand functions, because they
have similar trends. 
     With R
NM in the money-demand equation, the DOLS estimate of
2y is 0.47, close to the estimate with R
TB.  However, the interest
rate coefficient 2R is -0.082, more than twice the previous
estimate.  This result reflects the fact that long-run movements
in R
NM are smaller than movements in R
TB.  For example, R
NM rises
by 4.5 percentage points from 1960 to 1981, while R
TB rises by
11.1 points.  With R
NM, a given change in real balances is
explained by a smaller change in the interest rate, implying a
larger coefficient.
     B. Deviations from Long-Run Equations
     The results so far do not tell us whether a money demand
function can explain quarter-to-quarter or year-to-year movements
in real balances.  These movements might be predicted by the
long-run equation (1), or they might be deviations from this
equation.  In the latter case, we need an additional model of
short-run dynamics to understand the data.  
     To see how much equation (1) explains, I examine the path of
real balances that it implies, given the paths of output and
interest rates.  This path is given by
   (2)     (m-p)*  = "’ + 2y’y+ 2R’R , 
where ’ denotes an estimate.  2y’ and 2R’ are DOLS estimates, and
"’ is the mean of (m-p)-2y’y-2R’R.  The quantity (m-p)* is an
estimate of the long-run equilibrium level of real balances.  To
interpret the results, I also compute "equilibrium velocity,"11
defined as v* / y -(m-p)*.  I compare v* to the actual path of
velocity v.
     Figure 2 presents the results.  The top panel compares v to
v* when the interest rate is R
TB, and the bottom panel does the
same for R
NM.  v and v* are usually closer in the second case. 
The average value of (v-v*)
2 is 3.6 x 10
-3 for R
TB and 1.4 x 10
-3
for R
NM.  Thus the use of R
NM reduces the apparent size of short-
run velocity fluctuations around the equilibrium level.
     The choice of interest rate makes the greatest difference
for the period before 1981.  For this subsample, the average
value of (v-v*)2 is more than three times larger with RTB than
with RNM.  As shown above in Figure 1, RTB fluctuated
substantially before 1981.  The swings in RTB imply corresponding
swings in equilibrium velocity, but the actual path of velocity
was smooth.  RNM grew more smoothly than RTB, and thus produces a
v* path that more closely matches v.
     The results for RNM suggest again that money demand is not
very mysterious.  The increased volatility of velocity after 1980
corresponds to increased volatility in v*.  Indeed, the “velocity
shock” of 1981-82 is overexplained by the long-run money-demand
function: given the sharp fall in RNM, v* falls even more than v. 
Overall, the long-run equation explains much of the velocity
behavior that has puzzled researchers.  
V. A PARTIAL ADJUSTMENT MODEL
     The previous section shows that a long-run money demand12
equation explains much of the behavior of velocity.  Here I go a
step farther to explore deviations from the long-run relation. 
It turns out that Goldfeld’s (1973) partial adjustment model
explains most of these deviations.  Once again, the choice of an
interest rate is crucial for the results.
     A. The Behavior of Nominal Money
     To motivate the partial-adjustment model, I first examine
the data from a new angle.  Figure 3 shows the path of nominal
money, m.  It also shows the path of money implied by the long-
run money demand function with R=RNM.  This path is m* = (m-
p)*+p, where (m-p)* is given by equation (2).  Note that the
deviations of actual from equilibrium money, m-m*, are the same
as the velocity deviations v-v* examined above.  However,
comparing m and m* provides intuition about the behavior of
short-run money demand.        
     Specifically, in Figure 3, actual money m appears to be a
smoothed version of equilibrium money m*.  The two variables
follow the same upward trend, but m fluctuates less: the variance
of the change in m is 1.1x10
-4, compared to 4.0x10
-4 for the
change in m*.  Thus the differences between actual and
equilibrium money do not appear to reflect short-run shifts in
money demand, which would cause m to fluctuate around m*. 
Instead, there seems to be some stickiness in m.  Partial-
adjustment models are designed to explain such behavior.
     B. The Model
     I assume that money holdings differ from m*, the long-run2 DOLS estimates of long-run parameters are super-consistent.  Thus
these parameters can be treated as known in the second-step
regression (there is no generated-regressor problem).
13
equilibrium level, for two reasons.  First, there are transitory
shocks to desired money holdings arising from shifts in tastes or
technology.  Desired money holdings are m*+0, where 0 follows a
stationary process with zero mean.
     Second, actual money holdings do not adjust fully to the
desired level.  Current m depends partly on m*+0 and partly on
lagged m:
   (3)     m  =  k + :(m*+0) + (1-:)m-1 ,   k>0, 0<:<1 .
Equation (3) is optimal if agents suffer quadratic losses from
changes in m and from deviations of m from m*+0.  The parameter
: is the speed of adjustment of money holdings.  The constant k
arises because m* has a positive trend (see Nickell, 1985).
     To estimate this model, I assume that the shock 0 follows
an AR-2 process: 0 = D10-1+D20-2+<.  Quasi-differencing equation
(3) leads to
   (4)     m  =  k(1-D1-D2) + (1-:+D1)m-1 + (:D1-D1+D2)m-2 
               - (1-:)D2m-3 + :(m* - D1m*-1 - D2m*-2) + :< .
There are four parameters of short-run money demand: :, k, D1,
and D2.
     Following Duca (2000), I estimate equation (4) with both
one-step and two-step methods.  In the two-step case, I use the
series for m* constructed from the DOLS regression and estimate
the parameters of (4) by non-linear least squares.
2  In the one-
step case, I use the long-run money demand function to write m*14
in terms of p, y, and R.  Then I jointly estimate the parameters
of (4) and the parameters of long-run money demand (except the
constants k and ", which are not separately identified). 
     Table II presents the results.  In the two-step case, the
estimate of the adjustment parameter : is 0.20.  Thus money
holdings adjust 20% toward the optimal level in one quarter and
59% in a year.  This adjustment speed is close to estimates from
the heyday of partial adjustment models (e.g. Goldfeld, 1973). 
The transitory money-demand shocks have substantial serial
correlation (D1=0.54 and D2=0.21).
     The one-step procedure produces similar estimates of the
short-run parameters.  In addition, the long-run income and
interest-rate coefficients are close to the DOLS estimates in
Table I.
     Once again, the use of RNM is important for the results. 
When the model is estimated with RTB as the interest rate, the
adjustment speed is only 0.08.  This result reflects the fact
that RTB fluctuates before 1980 but velocity is steady, which
suggests very slow adjustment.
     C. Another Look at Velocity Fluctuations
     To evaluate the model’s fit, note first that the variance of
:0, the error in the partial adjustment equation (3), is 1.7x10
-4
(for the two-step estimates).  This is only 12% of the variance
of m-m*, the deviation of money from its long-run equilibrium. 
Thus slow adjustment rather than unexplained shocks to money
demand explain most of m-m*.15
     Figure 4 compares the path of velocity to the path predicted
by the model.  The predicted path is derived from the partial-
adjustment equation (3) with the 0’s set to zero and the
parameters given by two-step estimates.  For the first
observation (1959:2), I use the actual value of lagged m in (3);
for the other observations, I use the predicted m from the
previous period.  Given the initial m-1 and the series for m*,
the predicted path shows how velocity would have evolved if there
were no shocks to desired money holdings and m adjusted to m* at
the estimated rate.  The Figure shows that predicted and actual
velocity are usually close to each other.      
     Figure 4 helps us understand some famous historical
episodes, notably the fall in velocity in 1981-82.  Recall from
Figure 2 that the long-run money demand equation predicts a
larger velocity fall than the one that actually occurred.  In
contrast, the predicted velocity path in Figure 4 matches the
actual path almost perfectly over 1981-82.  Slow adjustment
explains why actual velocity fell less than equilibrium velocity
when interest rates fell.    
     The partial adjustment model also helps explain other
episodes.  The sharp fall in velocity over 1985-87 – the “M1
explosion” – is mostly predicted by the model.  The model does
not fully resolve the “missing money” puzzle of the late 1970s:
actual velocity drifts above predicted velocity during that
period.  However, one can interpret this episode as a moderate-
sized, transitory shock to money demand, not a breakdown of the16
money-demand relation.  
     D. Partial Adjustment vs. Error Correction
     Goldfeld’s partial adjustment model broke down in the 1970s,
and attempts to repair it have failed.  As a result, the partial
adjustment model has been “largely abandoned” (Hoffman et al.,
1995).  In recent years, students of short-run money demand have
estimated “error-correction” models that impose fewer theoretical
restrictions (e.g. Baba et al [1992], Duca [2000]).  These models
assume that money eventually moves toward its equilibrium level, 
but they also allow arbitrary effects of many variables on money
growth.
     This paper aims to revive the partial adjustment model. 
Thus it is natural to ask whether the model’s assumptions fit the
data.  The partial adjustment model is a special case of an
error-correction model: it includes the same variables, but it
imposes restrictions across the coefficients.  Here I test these
restrictions.
     To see the relation between partial-adjustment and error-
correction models, rearrange equation (4) to obtain
   (5)     )m   =   k(1-D1-D2) + :(1-D1-D2)(m*-1-m-1)    
               + (D1-:D1-:D2))m-1 + (1-:)D2)m-2 + :)m*
               + :D2)m*-1 + :< .
 Using the definition of m*, this becomes
   (6)     )m   =   k(1-D1-D2) + :(1-D1-D2)(m*-1-m-1)
               + (D1-:D1-:D2))m-1 + (1-:)D2)m-2 + :)p 
               + :D2)p-1 + :2y’)y + :D22y’)y-1 + :2R’)R17
               + :D22R’)R-1 + u< .
Equation (6) is an error-correction model: the change in m
depends on an error-correction term (m*-1-m-1), lags of the change
in m, and current and lagged changes in p, y, and R.  However,
once 2’y and 2’R are set at DOLS estimates, the ten coefficients
in (6) are determined by only four parameters (k, :, D1, and D2). 
Thus the partial adjustment model places six restrictions on the
error-correction model.    
     A test of the partial adjustment model based on sums of
squared residuals yields an F statistic of 0.7, with a p-value
above 0.5.  Thus the partial adjustment model fits the data.  We
need not accept the lack of parsimony in error-correction models.
     Once again, the choice of an interest rate is crucial to the
results.  I have also tested the partial adjustment model when
the interest rate is the Treasury bill rate rather than RNM.  In
this case, the F statistic is 7.6 (p<0.01), so the model is
rejected.
VI. CONCLUSION
     This paper estimates a long-run money demand function and 
interprets deviations from this relation with a partial
adjustment model.  The interest rate in the money demand function
is the average return on near monies, such as savings accounts
and money market mutual funds.  The model explains most of the
behavior of M1 velocity from 1960 through 1993.  In particular,
the volatility of velocity after 1980 is explained by volatility18
in the return on near monies.
     The results of this paper have parallels in recent work on
M2.  Duca (2000) and Carlson et al. (2000) explain the “Missing
M2" of the 1990s with decreased costs of holding bond mutual
funds, which are substitutes for M2.  These papers and mine make
the same broad point: apparent instabilities in money demand
disappear if one correctly measures the opportunity cost of
money. 
     Future research should extend the analysis from 1993 to the
present, which requires accounting for sweep programs.  A measure
of narrow money should include the balances in sweeps, which are
just as liquid as demand deposits.  The Federal Reserve does not
report sweep balances, but Dutkowsky and Cynamon (2001a, 2001b)
estimate them from flows into sweeps.  Dutkowsky and Cynamon find
that long-run money demand is stable through 2000 when sweeps are
included in money.  Future work can use the Dutkowsky-Cynamon
method to study short-run money demand.
     Future research should also address the role of money in
monetary policy.  Today most economists believe that central
banks should set interest rates with little regard to the paths
of monetary aggregates.  This consensus, however, is based on the
view that money demand is unstable.  My finding that M1 demand is
well-behaved suggests that we should reopen the policy question.19
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 Figure  3 
 
  Nominal Money and Long–Run Demand 








































Estimates of Long-Run Money Demand Parameters
a 
1960:3 - 1993:4 
 
 
  R = R
TB  R = R
NM 
    
θy 0.532 0.467 
 (0.031)  (0.024) 
θR -0.040 -0.082 













    T w o - S t e p    O n e - S t e p  
 
k  0.012  (not identified)  
   (0.002)    
µ  0.204 0.204 
 (0.039)  (0.042) 
ρ1 0.538  0.509 
 (0.127)  (0.128) 
ρ2 0.215  0.191 
 (0.102)  (0.101) 
θy 0.467
b 0.514 
 (0.024)  (0.029) 
θR -0.082
b -0.077 




                                                 
a Estimation is by Dynamic OLS with four leads and lags.  Standard errors in parentheses are calculated 
using Stock and Watson’s (1993) DOLS2 procedure. 
b DOLS estimates from Table 1. 
b  